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Executive Summary 
Strong implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC is considered to be a prerequisite of strong 
implementation of other articles of the Convention. Despite a majority of parties reporting some 
action in accordance with the Article, our findings indicate that its implementation creates a wide 
range of residual opportunities for policy influence.  
• First, implementation of the guidelines is highly selective: a majority of parties act on less than a 
quarter of recommendations, which provides functional-based opportunities for policy 
influence.  
• Second, implementation is primarily passive, achieved through conflict of interest, political 
financing and lobbying restrictions introduced independently of the FCTC. Such measures do not 
necessarily cover all policy actors with the potential to influence health policy and are commonly 
subject to exemptions, qualifications, and provisos, which fall short of the strong proposals 
contained in the guidelines. Consequently, they also create space for functional based 
opportunities for policy influence. 
• Third, measures introduced in response to the FCTC are typically restricted to health ministries 
(and not extended to other ministries with policy briefs relevant to tobacco control), not explicit 
about whether they extend to third parties acting on behalf of the industry, and rarely put into 
effect the entire range of proposals outlined in specific recommendations. This weak and 
incomplete approach to implementation provides functional, agent, and venue-based 
opportunities for influence.  
• Fourth, parties systematically overlook recommendations that facilitate industry monitoring. 
This facilitates residual opportunities for policy influence which are enabled by both weak and 
incomplete implementation of specific recommendations and gaps in the guidelines (see below).  
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• Fifth, in many cases implementation of the guidelines demonstrates a lack of joined up thinking, 
which, in some cases, diminishes the value of some actions in managing industry influence. 
There is, for instance, little merit in awareness raising measures if parties do not have 
substantive measures in place to exclude industry actors from health policymaking. Equally, 
measures restricting insider political activity which are nominally designed to apply to third 
parties are only likely to be effective where such actors are required to disclose their links to 
tobacco manufacturers. Finally, a number of parties implement guideline recommendations 
through uncodified, working norms, which, as some party reports make clear,[1] may leave 
implementation susceptible to changes in political administration. 
In practice, weak implementation is likely to be driven by a combination of factors such as poor 
understanding of Article 5.3 and its guidelines (illustrated by widespread misreporting in party 
reports), difficulties in building cross-party and departmental support for restrictions on industry 
political activity, conflicts of laws, and industry opposition.[2] Recognition of the risks associated 
with weak implementation does not appear to be a sufficient condition of robust implementation. 
Lao, for instance, reports that its measures only apply to lower ranking, “technical officials”, despite 
acknowledgement of the industry’s practice of focusing on “high-ranking” actors.[3] Although 
further analysis is required to disaggregate the relative importance of the potential factors behind 
weak implementation, frequency data indicating the extent of compliance achieved through passive 
implementation suggest that codifying guideline recommendations at the national level is generally 
a low priority.  
The policy risks associated with incomplete and selective implementation of the guidelines are likely 
to vary according to a wide range of policy-related and institutional factors - including pan-
governmental buy-in to the underlying objectives of Article 5.3 and effective monitoring and 
enforcement - and are, therefore, difficult to anticipate in the absence of in-depth case study 
analysis. However, a number of general inferences can be drawn from studies on tobacco industry 
political activity. First, the number of residual opportunities for policy influence is likely to deepen 
policy risks. Residual opportunities are not exclusive of one another. Recent research on the policy 
conflict relating to the proposed introduction of standardised packaging in the UK illustrates that 
tobacco companies’ seek to exploit all available opportunities for influencing health policy.[4] This 
heterogeneous quality of political action strongly suggests that weak controls on industry 
interactions, conflicts of interests, and policy subsidies have a cumulative and mutually reinforcing 
effect on the industry’s capacity to build consensus within government and legislatures against 
policy change. The continuing susceptibility of elected representatives to industry influence[5] is a 
case in point. In the context of weak implementation of conflict-of-interest provisions,[6-10] this 
permits tobacco manufacturers to relationship-build with elected representatives through 
hospitality and other expenditures,[11] in addition to applying direct political pressure using political 
constituencies comprising other actors in the tobacco supply chain[5]. Second, the fact that partial 
implementation limits the universe of possibilities for tobacco companies does not necessarily imply 
reduced influence. In 2000, for example, industry actors’ ability to access the Prime Minister’s office 
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in the UK, worked to weaken health policy even where access to other departments was denied.[12] 
Third, the fact that opportunities for policy influence are interdependent and have the potential to 
create additional channels of influence suggests that the type of opportunities left open by partial 
implementation is also important. These additional channels can expedite relatively subtle changes 
of emphasis in industry political activity. Partnerships between government and the industry on 
tobacco tax policy and the illicit trade in tobacco products, for example, can facilitate a range of 
venue, function, and agent based opportunities for policy influence by facilitating reliance on 
industry data, closer co-operation between industry actors and government officials, and increased 
access to policy actors.[13-19] They can also facilitate paradigmatic changes in political action. 
Access to officials involved in brokering trade policy, for example, can shape international trade and 
investment agreements, which, in addition to creating new, and potentially powerful, venues for 
policy influence by expanding tobacco companies’ access to investor-state dispute settlement 
procedures,[20] can also enable tactical shifts in how the industry lobby.[21] 
This last example highlights opportunities for policy influence facilitated by gaps in the guidelines, 
which do not explicitly address trade and investment agreements. Another important gap in the 
guidelines concerns parties’ increasing use of mandatory stakeholder consultations and impact 
assessments, characteristic of the cost-benefit approach to US administrative law. Stakeholder 
consultation creates a horizontal venue-based opportunity for policy influence, which circumvents 
restrictions on government-industry interactions. Further, by permitting third parties funded by 
major tobacco companies to represent themselves as independent actors and by taking a permissive 
approach to the types of evidence that can be relied upon by participants which allows respondents 
to draw on reports funded by the major tobacco companies[22-24] consultations facilitate agent and 
functional-based opportunities. Finally, the recommendations do not directly cover outsider political 
strategies.[25-27] Transparency provisions in the guidelines may help to monitor such strategies, but 
these are overlooked by the majority of parties. 
Policy Recommendations 
The findings underline the importance of parties taking an active approach to implementing all the 
Guideline recommendations, taking a whole-of-government approach to implementation,[28] and 
ensuring that measures explicitly apply to third parties working on behalf of the industry. 
Implementation should, where relevant, be formally codified in administrative measures or 
legislation, which integrate the full range of proposals outlined in discrete recommendations. 
Specific consideration should arguably be given to imposing obligations on tobacco industry actors in 
accordance with Recommendations 5.2 and 5.3 to submit information concerning their political 
activities, which should enhance effective industry monitoring and allow health officials and civil 
society actors to accurately track the industry’s response to restrictions on its political activity. 
Parties may also give consideration to introducing public health policy footprints, which mandate 
disclosure of public and elected officials’ contacts with stakeholders and supporting materials 
provided by lobbyists in the course of their work.[29] Ideally, this should be a live document, which 
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would help civil society actors scrutinise policymaking in real time.[29] Finally, there is a clear case 
for revisiting the guidelines. Industry political activity is mutable and capable of adapting to altered 
politico-institutional conditions. Emerging research indicates that the guidelines need to be 
developed to take account of innovations in political activity that centre on Better Regulation 
practices[22, 23, 30-32] and trade and investment agreements.[20, 33] Introducing general duties (in 
conjunction with specific measures) may partly address this phenomenon, particularly where they 
apply to policy actors across government.[34]  
There are several pathways to achieving these changes. Parties may consider the value of 
establishing inter-ministerial bodies aimed at facilitating a whole-of-government approach to 
implementing the guidelines.[35, 36] Civil society actors and academics should also inform public 
officials of the policy risks attendant on isolated efforts to prohibit or manage specific forms of 
political activity. Finally, where there is an absence of political will to implement Article 5.3, public 
health advocates may also explore the possibility of litigation. As one of several similar documents 
adopted at sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP), the governing body of the FCTC, there is 
a measure of agreement that the guidelines constitute a subsequent agreement under Article 31 of 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969[37] and, therefore, should be taken into account by 
parties in interpreting their obligations under Article 5.3. The preamble to the guidelines, which 
states that parties are “encouraged” to implement them and that their aim is to “assist Parties in 
meeting their legal obligations” under the Convention, emphasises the non-binding status of the 
guidelines. However, the Treaty’s structure (a primary agreement outlining general principles 
particularised by detailed guidelines for implementation) and other comments in the guidelines, 
which encourage Parties to implement measures beyond those outlined, arguably indicates that 
effective implementation of Article 5.3 not only requires Parties to adopt its recommendations in 
full, but that this represents the minimum necessary step to giving effect to the Article.[38] 
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